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AFTER ESPINOZA: WHAT’S LEFT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE? 
 
Carl H. Esbeck* 
21 Federalist Society Review 186 (2020) 
 
On June 30, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its decision in 
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue.1 In a 5 to 4 ruling, the Supreme Court held that 
when there is an educational program with a secular purpose the Free Exercise Clause requires 
that the program be administered without regard to the religious status of the service providers. 
Additional examples of qualifying secular-purpose programs might pertain to health care, 
social services, emergency disaster assistance, or low-interest loans for economic relief. Stated 
more generally, the principle is that a government cannot enact a law or program that 
purposefully discriminates against a religion, a practice because it is religious, or an individual 
because of his or her religious status.2 
 
 In 2015, the Montana legislature created a program to expand parental choice in 
primary and secondary education. The statute provided an income tax credit for any state 
income taxpayer who donated money to a student scholarship organization. In turn, these 
scholarship organizations use the donations to fund scholarships for students attending private 
K-12 schools. Kendra Espinoza and other plaintiffs enrolled their children in private religious 
schools. Ms. Espinoza successfully applied for scholarships to defray the cost of tuition for her 
two daughters. However, the tax credits and tuition awards were halted following a 
determination by the state supreme court that the credits indirectly aided religious schools 
contrary to a provision of the state constitution.3 
 
The decision in Espinoza built on Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer,4 where the 
Supreme Court held that a childcare center could not be denied a Missouri grant to pay for a 
new playground surface to enhance child safety simply because of the center’s status as 
operated by a church. With reference to a state constitutional prohibition on government aid 
going to a religious organization—a provision similar to that in Montana—the state of Missouri 
denied the funding because of the grantee’s religious status. This purposeful discrimination was 
found to violate the Free Exercise Clause. For some, Trinity Lutheran was distinguishable from 
Espinoza because the aid was for playground safety,5 which was perceived to be more secular 
in character than the religious elementary schools being assisted in Espinoza. 
 
 
 * R. B. Price Emeritus Professor and Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Emeritus Professor of Law, University of 
Missouri School of Law. Copyright November 2020, all rights reserved.  
 1 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., for the Court, joined by Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ). 
 2 See also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 
U.S. 618 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
 3 Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2252-54. 
 4 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). 




Two decades ago, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Helms held that the Establishment 
Clause permitted a government program of secular purpose to directly confer benefits to K-12 
schools, including religious schools, so long as care was taken that the aid monies not be 
diverted to an explicitly religious purpose.6 When it came to indirect forms of aid, the Court 
has been even more lenient in finding the Establishment Clause satisfied.7 In the latter instance, 
such as with school vouchers and tuition tax deductions, both forms of indirect aid, the power 
to choose is in the hands of the ultimate beneficiary who then exercises that power by selecting 
the service provider, whether secular or religious. Because the beneficiary is not a state actor, it 
does not matter should the benefit find its way to a religious provider where it could advance 
explicitly religious beliefs or practices. With indirect benefits, all that matters is that the aid 
accomplishes its designated public purpose. 
 
The Court in Espinoza observed that “the parties do not dispute that the [aid] is 
permissible under the Establishment Clause. Nor could they.”8 This makes sense only because 
the type of aid was indirect via tax credits. When the aid is indirect, it makes no difference 
whether the aid inures to the benefit of explicitly religious practices at recipient schools. 
However, in government programs where the nature of the aid is direct, Mitchell is still 
controlling. In that case, a religious provider is required to self-monitor to prevent diversion of 
the government funds to explicitly religious practices.9 
 
 Chief Justice Roberts limited the holding in Espinoza to status-based discrimination.10 
As he did in Trinity Lutheran, Justice Gorsuch pointed out that a distinction between religious 
status and religious use made little sense.11 What good is a right to be Catholic if there is no 
right to practice your Catholicism? Chief Justice Roberts said he acknowledged the point but 
that it need not be examine here.12 Moreover, Roberts conceded that two of the Court’s 
previous free exercise holdings struck down restrictions on a religious use.13 Nevertheless, the 
Espinoza majority did not abandon the status/use distinction. Indeed, the Chief Justice did not 
 
 6 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion of four justices). The controlling opinion in Mitchell was that 
by Justice O’Connor, id. at 836, concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Breyer. See Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 
188, 193 (1977) (explaining that when Supreme Court fails to issue majority opinion, the opinion of the members 
who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds is controlling). 
 7 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding school vouchers for K-12 schools, including 
religious schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (providing special education services 
to Catholic student not prohibited by Establishment Clause); Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 
474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding a state vocational rehabilitation grant to disabled student choosing to use grant for 
training as cleric); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1983) (upholding a state income tax deduction for 
parents paying tuition at public and private schools, including religious schools). 
 8 Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2254. 
 9 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 860-67 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (setting forth monitoring requirement for direct aid). 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence is the controlling plurality opinion in Mitchell. See supra note 6. 
 10 Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2254-57. 
 11 Id. at 2275-78 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025-26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in 
part, joined by J. Thomas). One reason the status/use distinction should be abandon is that the plain text of the 
First Amendment phrase protects religious “exercise,” a word that entails not just one’s religious status but the 
conduct necessary to use one’s religious status by acting on it. 
 12 Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2257. 




overrule Locke v. Davey,14 and one reason for preserving Locke was that the state there had 
discriminated on the basis of use not status.15 In Locke, the State of Washington prohibited use 
of a college merit scholarship where the student was pursuing a degree to become a church 
pastor or cleric. The scholarship could be used at a religious college or university, and it could 
be used to enroll in classes offered by the religion department. Only use of the aid to pursue a 
divinity degree was prohibited.16  
 
Going forward, the Free Exercise Clause requires religious schools to be able to 
compete for secular programing without discrimination due to their religious status. To be sure, 
the government may require that recipient schools, including religious schools, be accredited. 
In that way, the state is assured that it receives full secular educational value in return for its 
aid. And, in accord with Mitchell, when the type of aid is direct the school is to prevent 
diversion of the aid to explicitly religious purposes. But that is the end of the state’s educational 
interests. It does not matter that religious schools also provide their students with a religious 
education and an integrated secular/sacred environment for nurturing the faith. Indeed, the 
religious character of a school is often a material reason that parents select it for their children. 
This approach also has the virtue of reducing regulatory entanglement between church and 
state. 
 
Espinoza does not mean that a state is compelled to provide funding for K-12 religious 
schools. A state may continue to provide money and other aid only to its public schools, 
thereby excluding all similarly situated private schools, whether nonsectarian or religious.17 
That too is discrimination of a sort, but it is not discrimination based on religion. 
 
The rationale behind Espinoza is to enlarge religious choice (historically termed 
religious “voluntarism”) within the educational, health care, and social-service initiatives of the 
modern welfare state. It avoids putting pressure on individuals and religious organizations 
through financial incentives by the government that are biased against religion. For example, if 
people want to obtain drug rehabilitation counseling at their church rather than from a secular 
agency, they ought to have that choice. If that freedom of choice is to be meaningful, then 
church-affiliated rehabilitation centers have to be equally eligible for government funding. Of 
course, the religious providers have to meet the same criteria for proficiency and success as do 
eligible secular providers, but their mere religious status should not disqualify them from public 
aid. 
 
In Espinoza, Montana became purposefully discriminatory only after state tax officials 
and later the state supreme court determined that the state constitution did not permit religious 
schools to participate in the scholarship program. Accordingly, while the original legislation 
was intended to assist all private schools, secular and religious, as finally implemented the law 
 
 14 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 15 Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2257. 
 16 Locke, 540 U.S. at 720-25. 
 17 See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973); Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Mo.), 
aff’d mem., 419 U.S. 888 (1974); Brusca v. State Bd. of Educ., 332 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff’d mem., 405 




turned out to be non-neutral because of the state constitutional exclusion. Because the 
discrimination was intentional, the Free Exercise Clause was violated. Had the claim concerned 
generally applicable legislation that was neutral as to religion, then the law of Employment 
Division v. Smith18 would have applied. Under Smith, generally applicable legislation that has 
an adverse but unintended impact on religion does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.19 
 
Now that the Supreme Court has adopted a rule that government aid for education, 
health care, social services, and other such secular-purpose programs must be available to 
providers without regard to religious status, what is left of the Establishment Clause? Just a few 
decades back many a commentator would have written with confidence that access to taxpayer 
funds for pervasively religious schools was a clear violation of the Establishment Clause. So, it 
has to be difficult for them to see a future for a clause that should be, from their point of view, 
the chief guarantor of the separation of church and state. Yet, despite what these commentators 
might be thinking, Espinoza can be seen not as a break with separationist doctrine but as an 
extension of it.  
 
In trying to properly interpret the Establishment Clause, the Espinoza Court sought to 
prevent government from putting its thumb on the scale in a way that burdens private religious 
judgment. In that light, Part I takes up the rule that the Establishment Clause forbids the 
government from preferring religion, or from taking sides in favor of religion in a private 
dispute. At the same time, the clause permits the government to exempt religion from 
regulatory burdens and taxes imposed on others. The state thereby leaves religion alone, and a 
state does not establish a religion by leaving it alone. In short, exemptions are not preferences. 
In Part II, I turn to the very different question concerning how the Establishment Clause 
addresses government symbols and other speech of religious content on public lands. With its 
vast resources, the government has a powerful and influential voice. When it speaks on 
religion, however, the issue is whether the government is turning its back on individual choice 
by taking sides among religions or favoring religion over its opposite. Parts III and IV take up 
the Court’s prohibition on deciding religious questions, which in turn is part of a larger 
category of cases decided under the church autonomy doctrine. The latter doctrine is about 
letting the church be the church. Finally, Part V briefly addresses the difficult task of giving not 
too broad and not too narrow a meaning to “religion” as that word appears in the First 
Amendment. 
 
The integrating principle behind many of these Establishment Clause matters is not 
about preventing the government from doing things that might work to the benefit of religion. 
Rather, it is to keep government from interfering with the private religious choices made by 
citizens, as well as walling off matters of the internal governance by religious bodies from 
interference by the state. Seen from that vantage, Espinoza is of a piece with a separation of 
church and state that minimizes the role of government in private religious judgments, all while 
expanding the liberty to exercise one’s religious faith. 
 
 
 18 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 




I.  PREFERENCES, EXEMPTIONS, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
 
 A. What is a Religious Preference? 
 
If we look back at the last century, there are examples of religious preferences that 
strike us as crude today. Government cannot penalize blasphemy, sacrilege, or other expression 
that speaks ill of a religion.20 Government cannot compel an individual, upon pain of material 
penalty, inconvenience, or loss of public benefit, to profess a religious belief21 or to observe an 
explicitly religious practice.22 
 
A plainspoken way of defining a religious preference is that the government is taking 
sides on a religious question. The establishment of a state church is the quintessential act of 
taking sides on a religious matter. The Establishment Clause prohibits government from 
purposefully discriminating between or among religions,23 and from using classifications based 
on denominational or church affiliation to extend benefits24 or to impose burdens.25 
 
On the other hand, the government may use classifications based on a person’s religious 
 
 20 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (striking down law permitting censorship of films that 
are “sacrilegious”). 
 21 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (overturning requirement of an oath declaring belief in God 
as a prerequisite for public office). Concerning compelled speech, this is an area where the purview of the Free 
Speech and Establishment Clauses overlap. Additionally, the Constitution provides that there may be no religious 
test for federal office. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 22 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or participate 
in religion or its exercise.”). 
 23 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (unconstitutional discrimination in state regulatory legislation 
adverse to new religious movements); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (ordinance permitting church 
services in park but no other type of religious meetings was a way of unconstitutionally preferring some religious 
groups over others based on a given sect’s type of religious gatherings or occasion for delivering sermons); 
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (unconstitutional to deny use of city park for Bible talks when 
permits were issued for worship services by other religious organizations and for Sunday school picnics). 
When a law of nondiscriminatory purpose has a disparate effect on a religious organization, the 
Establishment Clause is not violated. See Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 696 
(1989); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983) (effect on religious groups was not 
purposeful, but the unintended effect of IRS’s facially neutral, secular regulation); Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 n.23. 
 24 “Benefit” means affirmative financial assistance for a secular purpose in the nature of a subsidy, grant, 
entitlement, loan, or insurance, as well as a tax credit or deduction. A tax exemption, such as that upheld for 
religious organizations in Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), is to be distinguished from tax credits and 
deductions. A tax exemption is considered government’s election to “leave religion where it found it” and is thus 
not considered a benefit. The idea that exemptions, credits, and deductions for organizations should all be regarded 
alike as “tax expenditures,” while useful in other areas of legal policy, does not make sense in dealing with issues 
that arise under the Religion Clauses. See Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit 
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 345 (1976); Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes 
and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969). 
 25 Kiryas Joel Bd. of Ed. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702-08 (1994) (plurality opinion in part); Gillette v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); see Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 n.23 (further explaining Gillette). If the rule stated in the 
text was not the law, then merely holding religious membership would result in the availability of a civil 
advantage. For example, it would violate the rule stated in the text if Congress were to confer conscientious 




beliefs or practices—as distinct from denominational affiliation—to lift civil burdens from 
those individuals. For example, Congress may confer conscientious objector draft status “on 
religious pacifists who oppose war in any form.”26 Government cannot use classifications that 
single out a particular religion’s practice for favoritism, as opposed to favoring a general 
category of religious observance.27 For example, prison authorities may accommodate religious 
dietary requirements, but they may not accommodate only kosher diets. The latter would be a 
Jewish preference that violates the Establishment Clause. To accommodate religious prisoners 
and still satisfy the Establishment Clause, authorities should permit inmates to request food that 
meets dietary requirements of all religions in the prison population. 
 
 More generally, it is an unconstitutional preference for government to confer a benefit 
targeted on a religion or on those observing a particular religious practice.28 Estate of Thornton 
v. Caldor, Inc. is the leading case.29 The Connecticut legislature was about to repeal its law 
prohibiting retailing on Sunday. Anticipating that the repeal would lead to scheduling conflicts 
between employers and churchgoing employees, the legislature took the side of the employee 
over the retail employer.30 The new statute read in part: “No person who states that a particular 
day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such 
day.”31 Donald Thornton was an employee of Caldor, Inc., a retail department store. He was a 
Presbyterian and observed Sunday as his Sabbath.32 When the store began opening on Sundays, 
Thornton worked his Sabbath once or twice a month. Unhappy with the situation, he invoked 
the statute and demanded Sundays off. The store resisted, and the State Board of Mediation 
filed a lawsuit on Thornton’s behalf. The store argued that the Connecticut statute violated the 
Establishment Clause, and the Court agreed.33 
 
The Supreme Court found that the Connecticut law forced the private sector to assist in 
the religious observance of fellow citizens. That is what a preference often does: the 
government compels one private citizen to help another private citizen better conform to his or 
her religion.34 The religious preference in Caldor was doubly offensive, for the statutory right 
 
 26 See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 448-60; Grumet, 512 U.S. at 715-16 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). Government can either treat all religions alike, not concerning itself with unintended effects, or 
government can purposefully lift civic burdens from individuals based on their religious practices. What is 
impermissible is to lift such burdens based on an individual’s denominational or religious affiliation. 
 27 See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking down state law favoring Sabbath 
observance); cf. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 145 n.11 (1987) (explaining and 
distinguishing Caldor); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion). For 
example, if Saturday as a day of rest is required to be accommodated by employers, then all religious days of rest 
must be accommodated. If a student absence from public school is excused for Good Friday, then so must 
absences for all religious holy days. 
 28 See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 702-08 (legislation favoring one particular religious sect is unconstitutional); Texas 
Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14-15 (plurality opinion) (overturning sales tax exemption for those purchasing religious 
sacred writings). 
 29 472 U.S. at 709-11. 
 30 Id. at 705-06. 
 31 Id. at 706. 
 32 Id. at 705-06. 
 33 Id. at 706-07, 710–11. 




was “unyielding.” That is, the statute took no notice of the commercial burden imposed on the 
employer or of the inconvenience to Thornton’s co-workers who would have to fill in during 
his absence on Sundays.35 An unyielding statute was found to transgress the Establishment 
Clause. 
 
It is possible for a religious preference to pass constitutional challenge. In TWA v. 
Hardison, decided a few years before Caldor, the statutory provision in question—a 
requirement that employers adjust to the needs of their religious employees36—was a religious 
preference.37 However, the Court upheld the law because the employer’s duty of 
accommodation was not unyielding, as it was in Caldor, for the duty in TWA dissolved if the 
employer could show “undue hardship.”38 The Supreme Court did not reach the claim that the 
law requiring accommodations for religious employees—section 2000e(j) of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act—violated the Establishment Clause,39 albeit the prospect of such a ruling 
influenced the Court’s interpretation of the statute.40 The Court held: 
 
To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give [the 
employee-claimant] Saturdays off is an undue hardship. Like abandonment of 
the seniority system, to require TWA to bear additional costs when no such costs 
are incurred to give other employees the days off that they want would involve 
unequal treatment of employees on the basis of their religion.41 
 
Congress enacted § 2000e(j) to address a conflict created by private market forces. The 
government stepped into that conflict and took the side of the religious claimant over that of the 
employer. In that sense, § 2000e(j) is like the statute in Caldor, a religious preference that 
raised Establishment Clause concerns.42 However, unlike in Caldor, the § 2000e(j) preference 
was not absolute: employers did not have to comply if they could show that the requested 
accommodation would create “undue hardship.”43 The TWA Court avoided reaching the 
Establishment Clause question by interpreting the preference as relieving the employer from 
the duty to accommodate an employee when the burden was more than de minimis.44 So long as 
 
710. 
 35 Id. at 708–10. 
 36 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Care should be exercised to not confuse Title VII’s preference favoring religious 
employees in § 2000e(j), a duty imposed on employers, with Title VII’s exemptions for religious employers found 
in §§ 2000e-1(a) and 2000e-2(e)(2). TWA involved the former and Amos the latter. 
 37 432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977). 
 38 See id. at 84–85. 
 39 See id. at 69 n.4. 
 40 See id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s interpretation of the statute, by effectively nullifying it, has 
the singular advantage of making consideration of [TWA’s] constitutional challenge unnecessary.”). 
 41 Id. at 84 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted). 
 42 The Title VII accommodation at issue in TWA is not to be confused with general civil rights antidiscrimination 
statutes. Rather, it is a mandate to prefer employees who need affirmative help to both be employed and practice 
their religion. The latter asks of the private sector to take on a new obligation so that the employee can better 
practice his religion. It is a plea for special treatment, not equal treatment. Hence, it is rightly characterized as a 
preference. 
 43 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 




the statutory preference costs the employer nothing or next to nothing, it is harmless to the 
employer, and therefore the forced accommodation did not in fact burden the employer. That 
being so, the Court quite consciously misinterpreted what Congress required of the employer. 
And we now know, after Caldor, that it needlessly did so under the belief that the Court had to 
give this strained interpretation to save the statute from violating the Establishment Clause. So 
long as the accommodation is not unyielding but balances the competing interests of employer 
and employee, the statute does not fail the Caldor rule against religious preferences.45 
 
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc. is another example of an unconstitutional preference.46 
Larkin struck down a municipal ordinance that gave churches the right to veto the issuance of 
liquor licenses to businesses within a 500-foot radius of a church.47 Religious interests were 
preferred by the city over private retailing interests, and the preference was unyielding. The 
Court hastened to point out that it was not uncommon for cities to consider, along with other 
factors, the desire of churches to be free from noisy and rowdy neighbors. Such considerations 
are constitutional, but a zoning ordinance cannot take the next step and grant an absolute 
preference in favor of church interests over competing commercial interests.48 
 
B. Religious Exemptions Are Not Preferences 
 
The Establishment Clause is not violated when government enacts regulatory or tax 
legislation but provides an exemption from these burdens for individuals or organizations 
holding religious beliefs or practices. Such exemptions are at the discretion of a legislature and 
have as their purpose to ameliorate hardships borne by religious minorities and other dissenters 
who find themselves out of step with the prevailing social or legal culture. Statutory religious 
exemptions are common in our nation where there is a long and venerable tradition of religious 
tolerance. 
 
A categorical mistake has emerged in the secondary literature (but not the case law) 
where statutory religious exemptions are conflated with religious preferences. The two are quite 
different. As to preferences, it is entirely proper to be concerned when a government 
intentionally favors religion over the secular. Being able to distinguish an exemption from a 
preference is paramount. 
 
A true exemption ensures that a regulatory or tax burden imposed on others is not also 
 
 45 When it has the right case petitioning for review, expect the Court to give the text of § 2000e(j) a more normal 
reading and overrule TWA. It will remain a preference for religious employees, but one that is not unyielding to the 
interests of employers. 
 46 459 U.S. 116 (1982). 
 47 See id. at 117. 
 48 Id. at 124 nn.7–8, 125. There is commentary in Larkin suggesting that the constitutional offense was that the 
municipal ordinance delegated sovereign authority to a religious organization. Id. at 125-27. But the fact that the 
ordinance created an unyielding preference for religious interests over business interests was quite enough to 
justify the holding. In a modern regulatory state, many tasks formerly done by the government are delegated to the 
private sector. Just as the issuance of state drivers’ licenses can be delegated to an independent contractor, so can 
the issuance of liquor licenses. There are few exclusive sovereign functions. It is best to regard Larkin as a 




required of the religiously devout, the latter being already predisposed to conform to their faith. 
Government does not establish religion by choosing to leave it alone. Because the religious 
devotion of the one invoking the exemption—not the government’s decision to withhold 
regulation—is the driving force behind the devotee’s religious observance, any harm that 
befalls a third party is the result of privately motivated conduct. 
 
In Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, a janitor was dismissed from 
employment by his church-affiliated employer for failing to tithe to the church. He filed a 
claim for religious discrimination.49 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196450 exempts 
religious employers from such claims when the adverse employment decision is motivated by 
the religious beliefs or practices of the employer.51 The janitor claimed that this exemption 
violated the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court readily acknowledged that the janitor 
suffered a religious burden.52 However, he was harmed by the actions of his own church, not as 
a consequence of the exemption provided by Congress. As Justice Byron White wrote for the 
Court, “Undoubtedly, [the janitor’s] freedom of choice in religious matters was impinged upon, 
but it was the Church . . . and not the Government, who put him to the choice of altering his 
religious practices or losing his job.”53 
 
 A helpful way to think about Amos is to draw on the doctrine of state action. When a 
legislature passes a statute that says an entity in the private sector may take a certain action, it is 
not state action when that entity later avails itself of the opportunity. In Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. 
Brooks, a state legislature permitted landlords to use self-help in removing the possessions of a 
tenant who was behind on the rent and had abandoned the leasehold.54 A landlord availed 
himself of the self-help option. The tenant later sued the landlord for removing the tenant’s 
property without adequate notice and opportunity for a hearing as required by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The lawsuit was dismissed because the Fourteenth 
Amendment only binds state actors, and the landlord’s exercise of self-help was not state 
action. 
 
A true preference arises when government takes note of a religious dispute and then 
proceeds to impose its resolution on the conflict. These disputes often emerge in situations not 
of the state’s creation, usually from private social or market forces. When the legislature’s 
intervening law takes the side of the religious disputant, the government is intentionally 
preferring religious over the secular interests. If the government’s resolution of the dispute goes 
on to unyieldingly side with religion such that any consequential harm to third parties is not 
also weighed in the balance, then the Supreme Court will strike down the preference. The 
prototypical case is Caldor, striking down a law where Connecticut took the side of a religious 
claimant in a dispute with his employer. 
 
 49 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987). 
 50 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.  
 51 The exemption is an affirmative defense to any claim under Title VII, even a claim for retaliation. It begins with 
the text “This title shall not apply to . . . .”. Id. at § 2000e—1(a). 
 52 Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15. 
 53 Id. 





Similar to the rationale in Amos is that in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York.55 The 
Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a municipal property tax exemption for churches 
and other houses of worship advanced religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The 
Court 8-1 held that it did not. The Walz Court reached two conclusions of law. First, it held that 
the tax exemption for religious organizations was not a subsidy, but the government electing 
not to impose a tax burden on religion and thereby leaving religion alone.56 In the Court’s own 
words, the “grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer 
part of its revenue to churches but [it] simply abstains from demanding that the church support 
the state.”57 The Court distinguished an exemption from a subsidy saying that it “cannot read 
New York’s statute as attempting to establish religion; it is simply sparing the exercise of 
religion from the burden of property taxation levied on [others].”58 The proposition is simple: 
government does not establish religion by leaving it alone. As to the virtue of “leaving churches 
alone” arising from the principle of church-state separation, the Court observed: “The hazards 
of churches supporting government are hardly less in their potential than the hazards of 
government supporting churches; each relationship carries some involvement rather than the 
desired insulation and separation.”59 Unlike a religious preference, a tax exemption for 
religious entities “tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation [thereby] insulating 
each from the other.”60 
 
Second, the Walz Court rejected a quid pro quo argument as a justification for 
upholding the tax exemption. The tax commission had argued that the exemption was valid 
because it compensated religious groups for generating social capital by providing the poor and 
needy with welfare services, education, and health care.61 Religious charities do just that, of 
course, but viewing the tax exemption as a reward for good works invites unconstitutional 
entanglement by way of “governmental evaluation and standards as to the worth of particular 
social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the 
policy of neutrality seeks to minimize.”62 Moreover, a reward-for-works rationale would risk 
violating the rule against authorities taking up religious questions concerning the validity, 
meaning, or importance of religious beliefs and practices. The rationale behind the no-
religious-questions rule is that the government lacks the competence to make judgments 
concerning the civic value of the social work of religious organizations. To contemplate civil 
courts passing on such questions implies an established state church against which 
“unapproved” ministries and “underperforming” churches are civilly tested and found wanting. 
 
The Walz Court noted that religious organizations were not the only ones that received 
tax-exempt status under the city ordinance, but were joined by art, educational, and poverty-
 
 55 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 56 See id. at 675. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 673. 
 59 Id. at 675 (footnote omitted).  
 60 Id. at 676. 
 61 Id. at 674. 




relief organizations.63 However, the Court did not say that the inclusion of secular nonprofit 
organizations in the tax exemption was necessary to its holding. Indeed, in cases like Amos64 
and Zorach v. Clauson,65 the Court has upheld exemptions that were exclusive to religion. 
 
In addition to Amos and Walz, the Supreme Court has in five other instances rejected an 
Establishment Clause challenge to a discretionary religious exemption. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 
the Court upheld the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”),66 
which accommodates religious observance by prison inmates otherwise subject to correctional 
policies.67 In Gillette v. United States, a religious exemption from the military draft for those 
opposed to all war was found not to violate the Establishment Clause.68 The Court in Zorach v. 
Clauson found that a public school policy of release from a state compulsory education law to 
allow pupils to attend voluntary religion classes away from the school grounds did not violate 
the Establishment Clause.69 In Arver v. United States, the military draft exemptions during 
World War I pertaining to clergy, seminarians, and pacifists were found not to violate the 
Establishment Clause.70 Finally, in Goldman v. United States, the Court summarily rejected 
constitutional claims to the same draft exemptions, relying on the newly decided holding in 
Arver.71 
 
Academics who attack religious exemptions often blur the line between exemptions and 
preferences to make their case against the former.72 These scholars were particularly distressed 
by the decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,73 with its broad application of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”),74 that brought relief to a closely held for-profit 
corporation. In some instances, no doubt, elected lawmakers should exercise their discretion and 
narrow or deny an exemption sought by religiously faithful people. It is entirely proper for 
legislators to consider any palpable harm to third parties as part of the overall political calculus. 
This is the familiar interest balancing by the two political branches, legislative and executive. But 
elected lawmakers are not constitutionally prohibited from enacting religious exemptions. And 
 
 63 Id. at 666–67 & n.1, 673. 
 64 Amos, 483 U.S. at 338–39. 
 65 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (upholding a local public school release-time policy that exempted students from a 
state compulsory education attendance law to attend religion classes). 
 66 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. 
 67 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). 
 68 401 U.S. at 448–60. 
 69 343 U.S. at 308–15. 
 70 245 U.S. 366, 376, 389 (1918). 
 71 245 U.S. 474, 476 (1918). Arver and Goldman also illustrate that a religious exemption can be granted by a 
legislature even in the absence of coercion of religious conscience. The World War I exemption to the draft 
embraced not only religious pacifists, but also clergy and seminarians without regard to the latter two showing 
they would suffer a religious burden if drafted. See Arver, 245 U.S. at 367. 
 72 See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby 
Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAN. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 54-55, 61-62 (2014); Frederick Mark 
Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional 
Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 357-71 (2014). 
 73 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (holding that RFRA required exemption from requirement in Affordable Care Act that 
employers provide health care benefits contrary to their religious beliefs). 




once the political branches have struck their balance and enacted a law with a religious exemption, 
the judicial branch should not rebalance the equities under the guise of discovering a constitutional 
violation. 
 
II.  GOVERNMENT SYMBOLS AND OTHER EXPRESSION WITH RELIGIOUS CONTENT 
 
The Establishment Clause prevents the government from using its vast powers of 
communication to promote explicitly religious beliefs and practices.75 Accordingly, the 
government may neither confess explicitly religious beliefs76 nor advocate that individuals 
profess such beliefs or observe religious practices.77 However, government may acknowledge 
the role of religion in society and teach about its contributions to, for example, history, 
literature, music, charity, architecture, and the visual arts.78 
 
The Supreme Court has struggled with whether the Establishment Clause is implicated 
when a motto, anthem, official seal, or patriotic pledge places the government’s imprimatur on 
monotheism79 or on an explicitly religious belief or practice.80 For example, on the same day 
 
 75 See Westside Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“[T]here is a crucial 
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private 
speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”) (emphasis in original). 
 76 The Supreme Court has found that prayer, devotional Bible reading, veneration of the Ten Commandments, 
classes in confessional religion, and the biblical story of creation are explicitly religious. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U.S. 421 (1962) (teacher-led prayer); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (teacher-led prayer 
and Bible reading); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (teaching religion); Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578 (1987) (teaching creationism in science class); Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (barring the teaching of 
evolution in science class). On the other hand, legislation restricting abortion, Sunday closing laws, rules 
prohibiting interracial marriage, teenage sexuality counseling, and loaning secular textbooks are not explicitly 
religious. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (abortion restrictions); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 
(1961) (Sunday closing law); Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 604 n.30 (student interracial dating); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 
U.S. 589 (1988) (teenage sexuality counseling); Central Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244 (1968) 
(textbooks). 
 77 See McCollum, 333 U.S. 203 (facilitating the teaching of religion); Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (teacher-led prayer); 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (prayer and devotional Bible reading); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) 
(encouraging prayer); Edwards, 482 U.S. 578 (teaching creationism); Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (prohibiting teaching 
evolution); Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (prayer). But cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative 
chaplain and prayer). 
There are narrow exceptions to this rule in situations where government has isolated an individual from 
his or her religious community, such as in the armed forces or prisons. In these “special environments,” 
government may bring religion to the individual because government is responsible for the individual’s inability to 
obtain the requisite religious services at his or her own initiative. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“[H]ostility, not neutrality, would characterize the refusal to provide chaplains and places of worship 
for prisoners and soldiers cut off by the State from all civilian opportunities for public communion.”). 
 78 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 606-08 (Powell, J., concurring); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225; McCollum, 333 U.S. at 
235-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 79 America’s governmental institutions have long acknowledged general theism in such forms as the national 
motto (“In God We Trust”), the Pledge of Allegiance (“. . . one nation, under God, indivisible . . .”), and patriotic 
music (“God Bless America”). The idea that our governmental institutions are in a sense “under God” was present 
at America’s founding, and the political philosophy is reflected in many of its constituting documents and the 
words of early statesmen. See Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465-72 (1892) 




that a government’s display of the Ten Commandments was found constitutional, a similar 
display of the Ten Commandments was found unconstitutional.81 While teacher-led prayer in 
public schools has consistently been struck down,82 prayer by a state legislative chaplain has 
been sustained.83 
 
 In Town of Greece v. Galloway,84 the Supreme Court upheld a municipal practice of 
beginning meetings of the town governing board with a prayer delivered by a variety of local 
volunteer clergy. As historical precedent, the Court referred to prayers before the Continental 
Congress and the approval by the First Federal Congress of paid legislative chaplains. While 
some of the prayers were explicitly Christian, none disparaged other religions. The Galloway 
Court went on to reject four alternatives offered by those challenging the prayers. Each option 
was itself forbidden by the Establishment Clause. The alternatives were: (1) to allow only 
nonsectarian prayer, a limitation that officials could enforce only by parsing and censoring the 
content of each prayer;85 (2) to allow only prayer offered by individuals chosen through a 
process of “religious balancing” based on local demographics, inviting more intense 
involvement by officials with competing religions;86 (3) to offer only prayers acceptable to a 
majority of Americans, a none too subtle establishment of a national religion;87 or, (4) to script 
prayers that aligned with an American “civic religion,” a mix of patriotism and nationalism that 
competes with genuine religions and that the Court had earlier rejected as a form of religious 
 
(same). As Justice William O. Douglas observed for the Court concerning America in Zorach, “We are a religious 
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” 343 U.S. at 313. 
 80 Elected and other high public officials may, without violating the First Amendment, be particularistic about 
religious faith when they speak. In America, pronouncements by elected officials that interweave patriotism and 
religion have a long and venerable tradition. Familiar examples are presidential speeches that call upon God’s 
providence as the nation faces some new challenge or adventure or addresses that conclude with “. . . may God 
bless America,” celebrating Thanksgiving as a day for collective acknowledge of God’s hand in the harvest and 
other good favor, and the practice started by George Washington of taking the presidential oath of office with the 
added “. . . so help me God.” See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312-13 (dicta approving of “appeals to the Almighty in the 
messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; ‘so help me God’ in our 
courtroom oaths” and “the supplication with which the Court opens each session: ‘God save the United States and 
this Honorable Court’”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same). 
 81 Compare McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (Ten Commandments in county courthouse display 
case unconstitutional) with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (Ten Commandments monument on grounds 
of state capitol constitutional). 
 82 See Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (prayer offered by student at solemn occasion that 
authorities had set aside at beginning of high school football game violated the Establishment Clause). 
 83 See Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 (approving prayer by chaplain at beginning of state legislative day). 
 84 572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
 85 Id. at 581 (“To hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would force the legislatures that sponsor prayers and 
the courts that are asked to decide these cases to act as supervisors and censors of religious speech, a rule that 
would involve government in religious matters to a far greater degree than is the case under the town’s current 
practice of neither editing or approving prayers in advance nor criticizing their content after the fact.”). 
 86 Id. at 585-86 (“[T]he Constitution does not require [the town] to search beyond its borders for non-Christian 
prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing. The quest . . . would require the town ‘to make wholly 
inappropriate judgments about the number of religions [it] should sponsor and the relative frequency with which it 
should sponsor each’ . . . [which would be] a form of government entanglement with religion that is far more 
troublesome than the current approach.”) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 617 (Souter, J., concurring)). 
 87 Id. at 582 (“[I]t would be unwise to adopt what respondents think is the next-best option: permitting those 






In an effort to cut through the confusion, the Court recently signaled a more sweeping 
shift in how it approaches these cases. In American Legion v. American Humanist 
Association,89 the Court looked to historical events and understandings as a guide for 
interpreting the Establishment Clause. The case addressed a state-sponsored World War I 
memorial featuring a large Latin cross that was alleged to prefer the Christian faith. There is no 
denying that a Latin cross is the preeminent symbol of Christianity, for it speaks of the atoning 
sacrifice of Jesus Christ and is widely recognized as such. There also is no denying that the 32-
foot long cross was the dominant feature of the WW I memorial located on a traffic island at a 
major highway intersection in Maryland. 
 
Justice Alito began his opinion for the 7 to 2 Court by acknowledging that a Latin cross 
is profoundly religious for Christians, but he argued that at the same time the WW I memorial 
cross can be secular in its meaning from the viewpoint state.90 Further, a memorial or similar 
display can have a religious meaning at the outset, but then the object’s meaning—at least for 
the state—can evolve and transform over time.91 Thus the circuit court was mistaken to 
conclude that a Latin cross is inherently Christian and thus per se unconstitutional no matter the 
longevity of the symbol or other alterations to its context. In this regard, the Court majority 
entertained the theory—contested by plaintiffs—that the Memorial Committee initially had 
adopted the design because Americans first visualized the Great War in terms of the rows upon 
rows of individual white crosses at military gravesites in Europe.92 
 
In holding that the memorial’s cross did not violate the Establishment Clause, six of the 
seven Justices in the majority93 sharply criticized the test announced almost 60 years ago in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman.94 They then proceeded to follow a different interpretative approach. Four 
 
 88 Id. at 581 (“Government may not mandate a civic religion that stifles any but the most generic reference to the 
sacred any more than it may prescribe a religious orthodoxy.”). In Lee v. Weisman, the Court had already said, 
“The suggestion that government may establish an official or civic religion as a means of avoiding the 
establishment of a religion with more specific creeds strikes us as a contradiction . . . .” 505 U.S. at 590. 
 89 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (plurality opinion in part). Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court with respect 
to Parts I, II-B, II-C, III, and IV. Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and JJ. Breyer and Kavanaugh, delivered 
a plurality with respect to Parts II-A and II-D. 
 90 Id. at 2074, 2090. See also id. at 2082-83 (arguing that “longstanding monuments, symbols, and practices” tend 
to develop secular purposes and meanings alongside their religious origins); id. at 2075 (“The image used in the 
Bladensburg memorial—a plain Latin cross—also took on new meaning after World War I . . . .”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 91 Id. at 2074, 2075, 2085-87, 2089-90. 
 92 Id. at 2089 (“That the cross originated as a Christian symbol and retains that meaning in many contexts does not 
change the fact that the symbol took on an added secular meaning when used in World War I memorials.”). See 
also id. at 2076, 2085. 
 93 Of the seven justices in the majority, only Justice Kagan would keep at least the first two prongs of the Lemon 
test. Id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring in part). 
 94 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Court in Lemon said that a government’s law or practice challenged under the 
Establishment Clause must pass a test consisting of three factors: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the 




of the six, now a plurality, interpreted the Establishment Clause by aligning it with historical 
practices and understandings.95 Justice Alito, in this part of his opinion commanding only a 
plurality, collected examples from federal historical events and noted that officials involved in 
these occurrences were careful to embrace multiple Christian denominations and to disparage 
no faiths.96 He did not claim that these historical examples were inclusive of all faiths. 
However, given the 1919–1925 period when the memorial was designed and erected, it was 
sufficient that those who conceived the memorial, centered as it was on a large Latin cross, 
moved forward in a spirit of inclusiveness with respect to religion and did not intentionally 
disparage others. 
 
III.  THE PROHIBITION ON RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS AND THE RHETORIC OF 
“ENTANGLEMENT” AND “ENTANGLEMENT AVOIDANCE” 
 
 In Thomas v. Review Board,97 the state sought to defeat an employee’s free exercise 
claim challenging the government’s denial of unemployment compensation. Thomas was laid 
off from a factory when he refused to work on parts for military tanks because he was a 
religious pacifist. By using the testimony of a co-worker who was also a longtime member of 
the same religion as Thomas, the state sought to show that Thomas, a new convert, was 
misapplying the teachings of his denomination. The Supreme Court would have none of it, 
observing that Thomas “drew a line” concerning his beliefs that the state had to accept lest the 
civil courts become “arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”98 
 
It is common for the modern Supreme Court to declare that the judiciary must avoid 
legal classifications that cause it to probe into the religious meaning of words, practices, or 
events,99 as well as for the courts to avoid making determinations concerning the centrality of a 
 
marks omitted). It appears the Lemon test is dead, but the approach in American Legion is as close as the Court 
will get to explicitly pronouncing it dead. 
 95 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087-88 (Alito, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and 
Kavanaugh). 
 96 Id. at 2087-88. 
 97 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 98 Id. at 715, 716. Thomas was a Jehovah’s Witness. He believed his religion prohibited him from working in a 
factory on the task of fabricating turrets for military tanks. Id. at 710. 
 99 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 843-44 (1995) (university should avoid distinguishing 
between evangelism, on the one hand, and the expression of ideas merely approved by a given religion); Bob 
Jones, 461 U.S. at 604 n.30 (avoiding potentially entangling inquiry into religious practice); Widmar v. Vincent, 
454 U.S. 263, 269-70 n.6, 272 n.11 (1981) (holding that inquiries into religious significance of words or events are 
to be avoided); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16 (not within judicial function or competence to resolve religious 
differences); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 450 (Congress permitted to accommodate “all war” pacifists but not “just war” 
inductees because to broaden the exemption invites increased church-state entanglements and would render almost 
impossible the fair and uniform administration of selective service system); Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 (avoiding 
entanglement that would follow should tax authorities evaluate the temporal worth of religious social welfare 
programs is desirable); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-07 (1940) (petty officials not to be given 
discretion to determine what is a legitimate “religion” for purposes of issuing permit); see also Rusk v. Espinosa, 
456 U.S. 951 (1982) (aff’d mem.) (striking down charitable solicitation ordinance that required officials to 




religious belief that has been drawn into question.100 Such declarations affirm what is an 
important restraint on the jurisdictional reach of the courts. Typically called the “religious 
question doctrine,” the rule bars the judiciary—indeed all civil officials and authorities—from 
attempting to resolve disputes over the correctness of what a religious person or organization 
believes, or from taking up an issue that goes to the validity, meaning, or importance of a 
religious belief or practice. 
 
The prohibition on religious questions developed in response to a threefold concern: (1) 
judges lack competence to resolve doctrinal questions; (2) the government must not interfere in 
matters internal to a given religion; and (3) when a court favors one interpretation of a sacred 
text or miraculous event over competing interpretations, there is a micro establishment of 
religion. There are two meanings to the concern about lack of judicial competence. First, the 
civil courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over religious questions. Second, civil 
judges do not have the theological training and experience to rightly divine answers to religious 
questions.101 The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is attributable to the Establishment Clause. 
It is a mark of a state church, such as the Church of England, that the civil government 
determines the doctrine and liturgy of the church. When government in any of its offices, 
including the office of civil judge, takes on the business of resolving religious disputes, it ends 
up favoring one side and disfavoring the other. That corrupts voluntary religion and is divisive 
within the civic polity. Government divining and dictating religious truth (or falsehood) has 
inevitably resulted in a breach of the peace by inflaming and multiplying civic divisions along 
religious lines. The American solution is to bracket religious questions and move them outside 
the government’s authority, resulting in more liberty and more domestic tranquility. This is 
church-state separation at its most constructive. Of course, political and religious disagreement 
and division is protected by the Free Speech Clause.102 Divisiveness does not itself violate the 
Establishment Clause, but certain governmental actions that help cause divisions along 
religious lines do violate the clause. For example, when government takes sides in a religious 
controversy, it is violating the rule against religious questions—and exercising such authority is 
forbidden by the Establishment Clause. 
 
RFRA103 has been the cause of some high-stakes applications of the religious question 
rule. When filing a claim under RFRA, an element of the prima facie case is to show that 
 
 100 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (rejecting free exercise 
test that “depend[s] on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual 
development”); Amos, 483 U.S. at 336 (recognizing a problem when government attempts to divine which jobs are 
sufficiently related to the core of a religious organization so as to merit exemption from statutory duties is 
desirable); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (rejecting government’s argument that free exercise 
claim does not lie unless “payment of social security taxes will . . . threaten the integrity of the Amish religious 
belief or observance”); Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87 (same). 
 101 The latter task is not akin to the choice-of-law problem of a judge determining the law of a foreign country. 
Rather, in many instances religious doctrine has evolved, or is said by one faction to have evolved, such that the 
task of determining current orthodoxy is both contested ground and a moving target. 
 102 See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 641 (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan 
observes that religious organizations have as much right as other types of organizations to engage in political 
activism. 




claimants are “substantially burden[ed]” in their religion.104 The substantial-burden element 
does not invite a judicial inquiry into whether the religious belief at issue is central to or 
mandated by the claimant’s faith system.105 That would be a question concerning the 
importance or meaning of the religious belief at issue and thus forbidden. Rather, as the Court 
held in Hobby Lobby, the question the text of RFRA poses is whether the challenged law or 
policy “presents believers with the choice of either violating their religious beliefs or suffering 
a substantial penalty.”106 In Hobby Lobby, an employer’s failure to provide the required 
contraception coverage in health care plans for its employees, or to direct its insurance carrier 
do it at no additional cost to the employer, resulted in tens of thousands of dollars in fines. 
Fines at that level easily met the substantial-burden element. 
 
Similarly, in Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania,107 the Third Circuit found that 
the order of Little Sisters failed RFRA’s required showing of a substantial burden on religion. 
The health care regulations required that the Little Sisters merely sign a certificate to relieve the 
religious order of the contraception mandate, in which case the insurance carrier would take 
over the legal duty. The circuit court deemed this a minor, one-time inconvenience to the Little 
Sisters.108 You can almost imagine the circuit panel wrongly thinking, “Look, Sisters, just sign 
the piece of paper and be done with it, once and for all. How hard is that?” But the substantial-
burden element does not ask how easy it would be for religious claimants to violate the 
teachings of their faith in order to comply with the offending law. That would be a judgment 
concerning the importance of a religious practice to the claimant and thus violates the rule 
against answering religious questions. Rather, RFRA’s substantial-burden element frames the 
inquiry as one that can be answered by a civil judge: “What harm occurs if the religious 
claimant remains faithful and disobeys the law?” The Little Sisters would have incurred 
thousands of dollars in penalties if they did not comply—easily a substantial burden as the 
Court had previously held in Hobby Lobby.109 
 
It was in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York,110 that the Supreme Court first sang the 
virtues of avoiding entanglement between the institutions of church and state. A property tax 
exemption for churches was not only found to be consistent with the Establishment Clause, but 
the Court praised the exemption because it avoided administrative entanglements otherwise 
present in the property appraisal and tax administration of ad valorem statutes.111 Just one year 
later in Lemon, the Court fashioned a wholly new requirement that governments eschew 
“excessive entanglement” between church and state to avoid violating the Establishment 
 
 104 Id. at 2000bb-1(a). 
 105 This principle was added to RFRA by amendment in August 2000. See Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
 106 573 U.S. at 726. 
 107 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020). 
 108 See Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 930 F.3d 543, 572-74 (3d Cir. 2019), reversed Little Sisters of 
the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020). 
 109 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 720. 
 110 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 111 Id. at 674 (holding that exemption had the laudable effect of not expanding “the involvement of government 
[with religious organizations] by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the 




Clause.112 However, in a complex society a certain level of regulatory interaction between 
church and state is inevitable, even desirable. For example, churches could hardly be exempt 
from building safety codes or zoning ordinances. While the Lemon test is now in disfavor, for a 
time there were cases where administrative entanglement alone, deemed to be excessive by 
some measure never quantified, led to laws being deemed unconstitutional.113 That unhappy 
state of affairs seems to finally have gotten sorted, and “entanglement” is no longer a stand-
alone violation of the Establishment Clause. The idea that regulatory entanglements 
independently implicate the Establishment Clause has now been narrowed and subsumed into 
other existing prohibitions like the prohibition on religious questions. Judges and lawyers 
continue to refer to “entanglement” as a descriptor for when a church-state boundary has been 
crossed, but that is just a succinct and colorful way of describing some other failure by officials 
to heed the rule against taking up religious questions. 
 
The religious question prohibition does not forbid government authorities from 
inquiring into the sincerity of a party asserting a claim to religious freedom.114 As difficult as it 
can be to measure what is in the hearts of people with respect to their religious profession, 
requiring sincerity is a logical necessity. The Religion Clauses must not be allowed to become a 
refuge for fakers, frauds, and charlatans. 
 
The scope of the religious question rule also leaves room for government to make 
inquiries about a religion. These are factual findings identifying a given religion’s nature, 
beliefs, or practices that do not go on to assess their validity, meaning, or importance. For 
example, a civil magistrate, using the familiar rules of evidence, can determine whether a 
community center or an international disaster relief organization is a religious employer that 
therefore qualifies for an exemption from federal employment nondiscrimination laws.115 It is 
no invasion of religious freedom to ask an employer, claiming to be statutorily exempt because 
religious, to demonstrate that it is organized under state law as a religious corporation and that 
it holds itself out to the public as such. A recent decision concerning collective bargaining and 
a religious college is illustrative. Reversing a prior decision to the contrary, the National Labor 
Relations Board ruled that lay faculty at a Lutheran college were not subject to union 
organization.116 The prior case law recognized collective bargaining rights for lay faculty 
unless a college was “substantially religious in character.”117 That put the NLRB in the position 
of making exacting inquiries into the religious curriculum and other programs at the college, 
and then weighing the religious importance of these classes and other faculty tasks. Judging the 
degree of religiosity of these matters was unconstitutionally entangling. To avoid transgressing 
 
 112 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (“entanglement” elevated to a third test for measuring Establishment Clause 
compliance). 
 113 Lemon held that state programs to aid K-12 religious schools generated excessive entanglement between 
church and state in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 617-18. 
 114 The leading case on sincerity as necessary to invoking a religious freedom claim under the First Amendment is 
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
 115 See, e.g., Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (developing an 
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the religious question rule, the NLRB’s new three-part inquiry looks only to whether the 
college: (1) holds itself out to the public as religious; (2) is a nonprofit entity; and (3) is 
affiliated with a church or other religious organization.118 Such findings of fact are permitted 
because they are about religion. 
 
IV.  THE CHURCH AUTONOMY DOCTRINE MORE GENERALLY 
 
 With respect to matters of internal governance, churches and other religious societies 
are immune from regulation or other juridical burdens.119 This has come to be known as the 
doctrine of church autonomy.120 While the principles of church autonomy reference both 
Religion Clauses,121 they are most easily derived from the Establishment Clause because of its 
natural grounding in church-state separation. 
 
The rule against religious questions discussed in Part III is a subpart of the church 
autonomy doctrine. Church autonomy also entails the selection and application of the 
organization’s polity (i.e., ecclesiology), the selection and control of clergy and other ministers 
(i.e., ecclesiasticism), and the admission and retention of church members. Common in this 
area of law are religious disputes over title to church property. Many state courts have devised 
“neutral principles of law” as a means of settling these disagreements. The formation of such 
neutral principles is permitted by the Supreme Court, even encouraged. But their adoption is 
permitted only if the neutral principles do not transgress church autonomy. In other words, the 
legal principles or rules adopted to settle a church title dispute are “neutral” only if they honor 
the doctrine of church autonomy. 
 
The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause each have their own line of case 
precedent. There is a distinct, third line of cases that tracks the development of church 
autonomy. That there is this third line of precedent further confirms that church autonomy is a 
separate and distinct principle of religious freedom. So under the First Amendment there are 
Establishment Clause cases, Free Exercise Clause cases, and church autonomy cases. 
 
The first case in this third line is Watson v. Jones.122 The Supreme Court in Watson laid 
down the first broad principles of church autonomy when courts deal with disputes within 
religious bodies that implicate doctrine, polity, and ecclesiastical oversight.123 To avoid 
trespassing on church autonomy courts should defer to church judicatories: 
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[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, 
or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which 
the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as 
final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.124 
 
Watson was a post-Civil War case that involved a struggle between two factions of a local 
Presbyterian church for control of the church building. Title to the property was in the name of 
the trustees of the local church. However, the deed and charter of the local church “subjected 
both property and trustees alike to the operation of [the general church’s] fundamental laws.”125 
The general church (denomination) was the Presbyterian Church of the United States. Its 
governing body was called the General Assembly. The ecclesiastical rules of the General 
Assembly stated that it possessed “the power of deciding in all controversies respecting 
doctrine and discipline.”126  
 
Following the Civil War, the General Assembly ordered the members of all local 
congregations who believed in a divine basis for slavery to “repent and forsake these sins.”127 
A majority of the local church members were willing to comply with the directive. A 
minority faction, however, deemed the resolution of the Assembly a departure from the 
doctrine held at the time when the local church first joined with the general church. The 
minority’s legal theory was that the general church held an interest in the property subject 
to an implied trust. The condition said to be implied was that the church adhere to its 
original doctrines. Any departure by the general church meant a breach of trust and thus 
forfeiture of its interest in the property. Accordingly, the minority faction claimed that the 
l o c a l  majority relinquished any right to control the property when the general church 
repudiated the original, proslavery doctrine. Because they were the “true church,” the 
minority faction maintained that it should be awarded the local real estate.128 
 
The Supreme Court  rejected the implied-trust theory— which originated in 
English law with its established Church of England129—because the  departure from 
doctrine inquiry would require civil adjudication of a religious question. The Watson Court 
gave three r e a s o n s  for d e t e r m i n i n g  t h a t  i t  d i d  n o t  h a v e  jurisdiction over the 
case: (1) civil judges are unschooled in religious doctrine and thereby not competent to 
resolve disputes concerning religious doctrine nor to properly interpret church documents 
and canon law;130 (2) for the civil law to award the property to the faction adhering to 
original doctrine would entail the government taking sides, thereby “establishing” one 
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creedal position while severely inhibiting r e f o r m  o f  religious doctrine;131 and, (3) both 
clerics and lay members of a church have voluntarily joined the entire church, the general 
as well as the local body, thus giving implied consent to the polity of the entire church and 
its a dministration.132 These bases for church autonomy are rooted, said the Court, in the 
American governmental system that—unlike the English system—separates the institutions 
of church and state, thereby sharply limiting the involvement of civil courts in the 
governance of religious bodies.133 
 
Watson’s principles were elevated to First Amendment stature in Kedroff v. Saint 
Nicholas Cathedral.134 The Supreme Court in Kedroff struck down a New York statute that 
displaced control of the Russian Orthodox Churches from the central governing hierarchy 
located in the Soviet Union with a church sub-organization limited to the Diocese of North 
America. The felt need to transfer control of ecclesiastical authority was linked to the Marxist 
Revolution of 1917 and doubt concerning whether Moscow had “a true central organization of 
the Russian Orthodox Church capable of functioning as the head of a free international 
religious body.”135 Because the statute did more than just “permit the trustees of the Cathedral 
[in New York City] to use it for services consistent with the desires of the members,” but 
transferred effective control over domestic churches by legislative fiat,136 the Court held that 
the statute violated the “rule of separation between church and state.”137 The Watson Court had 
repudiated the English implied-trust rule and its departure from doctrine standard, but only as a 
matter of federal common law. For well over half a century a number of states had continued to 
follow the implied-trust rule as a matter of their own common law. Kedroff, however, clearly 
foreshadowed the sweeping aside of the common law in those states still following the 
English rule. 
 
In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Church, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that Kedroff elevated the principles of church autonomy to First Amendment 
stature.138 Presbyterian Church involved a dispute between a general church and two of its 
local congregations over who had the authority to control the local church properties. The 
controversy began when the local churches claimed that the general church had violated 
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the organization’s constitution and had departed from original doctrine and practice.139 
Georgia still followed the implied-trust rule with its requisite fact finding into alleged 
departures from doctrine. This required the state court to determine two religious’ 
questions: what were the tenets of the general church at the time the local congregation 
first affiliated, and whether the general church had departed substantially from initial 
doctrines. On the basis of a jury’s finding that the general church had abandoned its 
original doctrines, the Georgia courts entered judgment for the local congregations. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not permit a departure from 
doctrine standard as a substantive rule of decision. The “American concept of the 
relationship between church and state,”140 the Court said, “leaves the civil court no role in 
determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property disputes.”141 
Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, observed that in principle courts could 
take jurisdiction of disputes over church property provided they followed neutral principles 
to be applied to all such similar claims to resolve disputes over title.142 
 
The Supreme Court in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich143 rejected an 
Illinois bishop’s lawsuit challenging a top-down reorganization of the American-Canadian 
Diocese of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church and his removal from office. Milivojevich 
involved internal church administration and a clerical appointment, which the Court 
determined were insulated from civil review under the First Amendment.144 There was no 
dispute between the parties that the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church was a hierarchical 
church and that the sole power to remove clerics rested with the ecclesiastical body in Europe 
that had decided the bishop’s case.145 Nor was there any question that the matter at issue was a 
religious dispute.146 Nevertheless, the state court had decided in favor of the defrocked bishop 
in Illinois because, in its view, the church’s adjudicatory procedures were applied in an 
arbitrary manner. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected an arbitrariness exception to the 
judicial-deference rule of Watson when the question concerns church polity or supervision of 
a bishop.147 When the subject  of the dispute is within one of the spheres of church 
autonomy, civil courts may not examine whether the church judicatory properly followed its 
own rules of procedure.148 To accept jurisdiction over such a subject matter is not “consistent 
with the constitutional mandate [that] the civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the 
highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, 
faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.”149 
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Using reasoning similar to that in Watson, the Milivojevich Court explained that there 
are three bases for a First Amendment prohibition on civil court jurisdiction in such cases. 
First, civil courts cannot delve into canon law or church documents.150 These matters are too 
sensitive to permit any civil probing because such inquiries may prove intrusive and entail the 
court taking sides in a religious dispute. Second, civil judges have no training in canon law and 
theological interpretation.151 Third, the “[c]onstitutional concepts of due process, involving 
secular notions of ‘fundamental fairness,’” cannot be borrowed from American civil law and 
grafted onto a church’s polity to somehow “modernize” the church.152 The Supreme Court also 
reversed the state court’s unraveling of the diocesan reorganization, holding that the Illinois 
court had impermissibly “delved into the various church constitutional provisions” relevant to 
“a matter of internal church government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs.”153 The 
enforcement of church documents, often unclear to a civil judge, cannot be accomplished 
“without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity.”154 
 
The Supreme Court held in Jones v. Wolf that courts may, in limited instances, 
devise “neutral principles of law” to adjudicate intrachurch disputes that affect title to 
property.155 Courts may examine church charters, constitutions, deeds, and trust indentures 
to resolve property disputes using “objective, well-established concepts of trust and 
property law familiar to lawyers and judges.”156 The method’s advantage is that it 
sometimes “obviates entirely the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical 
polity or doctrine in settling church property disputes . . . .”157 However, a neutral-
principles approach may not be used where it trespasses into any of the subjects reserved to 
church autonomy. The Court said it was clear “that the First Amendment severely 
circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes.”158 
 
In Watson, the rule of judicial deference was encouraged as a means of resolving a 
dispute while still honoring church autonomy doctrine. That can work in a church with a 
hierarchical polity. In Wolf, “neutral principles of law” was approved as an alternative to 
judicial deference. Neither rule is an exception to the doctrine of church autonomy. Rather, 
these two rules are alternative means of resolving an intrachurch dispute over title while still 
honoring the principles of church autonomy: 
 
[T]here may be cases where the deed, the corporate charter, or the constitution 
of the general church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating 
to the ownership of property. In such a case, if the interpretation of the 
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instruments of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious 
controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by 
the authoritative ecclesiastical body.159 
 
In other words, the state-provided dispute resolution principles are “neutral” only if they avoid 
religious questions or otherwise transgressing on church autonomy. 
 
In January 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC.160 This was the Court’s first church 
autonomy case since Wolf was decided in 1979. Hosanna-Tabor involved a fourth-grade 
teacher, Cheryl Perich, who sued her employer, a church-related religious school, alleging 
retaliation for having asserted rights under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA).161 In the 
lower federal courts, the school raised the “ministerial exception.” The defense recognizes that 
religious organizations have exclusive authority to select their own ministers—which 
necessarily entails not just initial hiring but also promotion, retention, and all the other terms 
and conditions of employment. As a matter of First Amendment church autonomy, the 
ministerial exception overrides not just the ADA, but a number of venerable employment 
nondiscrimination civil rights statutes.162 
 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, wrote that 
“[r]equiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing 
to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the 
internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those 
who will personify its beliefs.”163 The Court said that although “the interest of society in the 
enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important . . . so too is the 
interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry 
out their mission.”164 Accordingly, in a lawsuit that strikes at the ability of the church to 
determine its leaders and teachers, any balancing of interests between a vigorous eradication of 
employment discrimination, on the one hand, and institutional religious freedom, on the other, 
is a balance already struck on the side of church autonomy: “When a minister who has been 
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fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment 
has struck the balance for us.”165 
 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of the Solicitor General 
(“OSG”) claimed that there was no ministerial exception because the First Amendment did not 
require one. All that was required, argued the OSG, was that the government be formally 
neutral with respect to religion and religious organizations. That was the case here, said the 
OSG, because the ADA treats religious organizations just like every other employer when it 
comes to discrimination on the basis of disability. The same is true of federal and state civil 
rights statutes prohibiting discrimination on the bases of sex, age, race, and so forth. The OSG 
allowed as how religious organizations had freedom of expressive association, but so did labor 
unions and service clubs, and they were still subject to the ADA.166 The nondiscrimination 
statutes could be blind to religion and religious organizations, asserted the OSG. And while 
Congress could choose to accommodate religion, the First Amendment did not require it to do 
so. 
 
The Court reacted to the OSG’s argument for a religion-blind Constitution by calling it 
“remarkable,” “untenable,” and “hard to square with the text of the First Amendment itself, 
which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.”167 Religious 
organizations have freedom of expressive association, not merely to the same degree as other 
expressional groups, but much more. The text of the First Amendment recognizes the unique 
status of organized religion, and a properly conceived separation of church and state that is to 
the good of both.168 So the Hosanna-Tabor Court held that the First Amendment requires a 
ministerial exception that is a defense in the nature of an immunity.169 
 
Before proceeding to examine more closely the facts that convinced the Court that this 
teacher was a minister for purposes of the exception, the Chief Justice had to distinguish 
Employment Division v. Smith.170 In Smith, the state of Oregon had listed peyote, a 
hallucinogenic, as one of several controlled substances and criminalized its use. The plaintiffs 
in Smith were Native Americans who had been employed as counselors at a private drug 
rehabilitation center.171 They were fired for illegal drug use after they ingested peyote in a 
religious ceremony, and they were later denied unemployment compensation by the state 
because they were dismissed for cause. The Smith Court held that the Free Exercise Clause was 
not implicated when Oregon enacted a religiously neutral law of general applicability, even 
when the law happened to have an adverse impact on the religious use of peyote. 
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Chief Justice Roberts admitted that the ADA was a neutral law of general applicability 
that happened to have an adverse effect on the Lutheran school’s personnel decisions.172 But 
then, for a unanimous Court, he drew a distinction: “The present case, in contrast [to Smith], 
concerns government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and 
mission of the church itself.”173 Without the ministerial exception, a civil court would be 
ordering a church to employ a minister by command of the state—historically an act of a state 
with an established church. The Court proceeded to carve out a class of cases based on subject 
matter to which the rule in Smith does not apply: those involving decisions within the church’s 
sphere of self-governance. The Court’s stepping around Smith is confirming evidence that 
church autonomy doctrine gives rise to a third line of cases separate from Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause precedent. 
 
Obviously, a sacrament is an important religious practice, and the Smith plaintiffs 
suffered a material burden on their religious observance that was unrelieved by the rule in 
Smith. But the point of church autonomy is not to relieve religious burdens as such. If it were, 
then Hosanna-Tabor would have been at odds with and thereby overruled Smith. That did not 
happen. Rather, Hosanna-Tabor distinguished Smith. What was remedied in Hosanna-Tabor 
was not a burden on an organization’s religious practice—that would be a Free Exercise Clause 
case—but the government’s intrusion into the self-governance of a religious organization—a 
church autonomy case. Acts of self-governance need not be religiously motivated. As the Court 
observed, “[t]he purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a 
minister only when it is made for a religious reason.”174 
 
The Hosanna-Tabor Court went on to provide another example in which Smith does not 
apply: in lawsuits over title to church property, the government may not take sides on the 
question concerning the rightful ecclesiastical authority to resolve the property dispute.175 
Again, the purpose of church autonomy is not to safeguard the decision to determine the 
rightful ecclesiastical authority only when it is made out of religious reasons.  
 
These two examples—a church selecting its own minister and a church determining the 
ecclesiastical judicatory with final authority to solve disputes over title to property—are 
contrasted with the religious practice at issue in Smith: an individual’s ingestion of peyote as 
part of a sacrament. The former go to internal governance, the issue in Smith does not. 
 
A survey of the High Court’s cases yields relatively few—yet important—subject 
matters of the sort where civil officials have been barred categorically from exercising 
authority: (1) the validity, meaning, or importance of religious questions, and resolving 
doctrinal disputes;176 (2) the selection of ecclesiastical polity, including the proper application 
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of procedures set forth in a church’s organic documents, bylaws, and canons;177 (3) the 
selection, credentialing, promotion, overseeing, discipline, or retention of clerics and others 
who are ministers by virtue of job function;178 and (4) the admission, discipline, or expulsion of 
church members.179 
 
 Church autonomy cases are relatively few but they are important because once it is 
determined the rule applies, no rejoinder is permitted by the opposing party. That is, once it is 
determined that a suit falls within the subject matter of internal church governance, there is no 
follow-on judicial balancing. There is no balancing because there can be no legally sufficient 
governmental interest to justify interfering in internal church affairs. The First Amendment has 
already struck the balance.180 In this regard, the Court criticized the OSG’s argument that the 
school’s religious reason for firing Perich was pretextual. “This suggestion misses the point of 
the ministerial exception,” wrote the Chief Justice: 
 
The purpose of the [ministerial] exception is not to safeguard a church’s 
decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The 
exception instead ensures that the authority to select and control who will 
minister to the faithful—a matter “strictly ecclesiastical,” . . . is the church’s 
alone.181 
 
Lower courts applying Hosanna-Tabor have properly interpreted the ministerial exception not 
as a religious right, but as a structural limitation on governmental action.182 That Hosanna-
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Tabor is a constraint on the power of the government explains why the case is rooted in large 
part in the Establishment Clause. The text of that clause bespeaks a structural limit on 
authority: “Congress shall make no law” about a given subject matter described as “an 
establishment of religion.” As Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “the Free Exercise Clause . . . 
protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission” by controlling who are its 
ministers, and “the Establishment Clause . . . prohibits government involvement in such 
ecclesiastical decisions.”183 The Chief Justice gave examples in which the English Crown had 
interfered with the appointment of clergy in the established Church of England.184 He wrote 
that the Establishment Clause was adopted in America to flatly deny such power to our national 
government.185 
 
There is a welcome absence of balancing tests in Hosanna-Tabor. Such tests abound in 
past areas of doctrine derived from the Religion Clauses, including: the prohibition on 
governmental endorsements of religion thought to lower the standing of religious minorities in 
the political community;186 a requirement that a law’s “principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” as distinct from lesser effects;187 and injunctions on 
government’s “excessive entanglement” with religion, as distinct from less intense 
entanglements.188 Balancing tests are still valid under the Free Exercise Clause, but not in cases 
where the subject matter warrants the categorical protection of what Justice Alito calls 
“religious autonomy.”189 In the latter instances, the First Amendment, understood within 
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America’s state-by-state disestablishments that broke with European models and gave rise to 
church-state separation,190 has determined that hiring, promoting, supervising, and dismissing 
ministers is a power denied to Caesar. 
 
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor went on to find that the fourth-grade teacher, Cheryl 
Perich, was a “minister” and therefore her claim must be dismissed. Perich held an earned lay 
title issued by her denomination. She also held herself out under the title of minister to claim 
tax advantages and for other reasons. It was not clear to the lower courts if the ministerial 
exception was limited to organizational leaders, visionaries, and top administrators,191 or if the 
definition also extended to those performing explicitly religious functions like teaching 
religion, leading students in chapel service, and directing students in classroom prayer. Perich 
was not an organizational leader or denominational visionary, but on the whole her job duties 
reflected a role in conveying the church’s message and carrying out its mission of transmitting 
the Lutheran faith. 
 
The circuit court in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru—when 
addressing application of the ministerial exception—treated the foregoing items in Hosanna-
Tabor as requirements on a check list.192 The High Court reversed. Writing for a 7-2 Court, 
Justice Alito began by noting that the ministerial exception is a part of the more encompassing 
“general principle of church autonomy” that relies on both the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses.193 In the two cases that were consolidated for the appeal in Our Lady, the Court said: 
 
The independence of religious institutions in matters of faith and 
doctrine is closely linked to independence in what we have termed “matters of 
church government.” . . . This does not mean that religious institutions enjoy a 
general immunity from secular laws, but it does protect their autonomy with 
respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution’s 
central mission. And a component of this autonomy is the selection of the 
individuals who play certain key roles. 
. . . Under this rule, courts are bound to stay out of employment disputes 
involving those holding certain important positions with churches and other 
religious institutions. . . . [A] wayward minister’s preaching, teaching, and 
counseling could contradict the church’s tenets and lead the congregation away 
from the faith. The ministerial exception was recognized to preserve a church’s 
independent authority in such matters.194 
 
The Court went on to find that the two elementary classroom teachers were “ministers” for 
purposes of the exception. Their employment claims alleging discrimination on the basis of age 
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and disability, respectively, were ordered to be dismissed. The nonrenewal of their employment 
contracts were said by the schools to be based on poor classroom performance,195 and thus the 
dismissals did not hinge on the schools having a religious reason for severing the employment 
relationship. That makes sense because what is being protected here is “autonomy with respect 
to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution’s central mission,” not a 
religious right vested in the employer. 
 
The Our Lady Court admitted that it would have been easier to find that the claimants 
were “ministers” if they satisfied the items on the checklist from Hosanna-Tabor, but it held 
that none of those items were required.196 What mattered was what the employees actually 
did,197 and the sort of institutions at which they were employed.198 The two classroom teachers 
had duties that were explicitly religious. The institutions here were K-12 religious schools, 
schools which are integral to passing on the Catholic faith to the next generation. The claimants 
taught classes in Catholic doctrine, led the students in classroom prayer and recitation of 
creeds, accompanied the students to weekly mass, and agreed to employment contracts setting 
forth the religious mission of the school and agreeing to do nothing to undermine it.199 The 
teachers “were also expected to guide their students, by word and deed, toward the goal of 
living their lives in accordance with the faith.”200 When “a school with a religious mission 
entrusts a teacher with the responsibility of educating and forming students in the faith, judicial 
intervention into disputes between the school and the teacher threatens the school’s 
independence in a way that the First Amendment does not allow.”201 So long as these functions 
are religious, it does not matter how much clock time the functions comprise in the overall 
school day. The guiding rule is not subject to a stopwatch test.202  
 
The schools preferred that their teachers were Catholic, but it was not required. To 
require it would disadvantage small sects who had limited qualified applicants from which to 
hire faculty and so could not always hire within the denomination. Further, it would entangle 
the courts in religious questions if candidates were limited to the same church or 
denomination.203 For example, determining whether a faculty candidate was a Catholic in good 
standing is to have the courts entangled in a forbidden religious question.  
 
As can be seen, rather than a search for a religious “minister” in the ordinary sense of 
that term (e.g., pastor, priest, rabbi, imam, and so on),204 the Court is asking one of two 
questions. Does the employee bear explicitly religious functions? That was the case in Our 
Lady with these Catholic elementary school teachers. Or is the employee in a position of 
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prominent leadership? If the answer to either question is in the affirmative, then the immunity 
applies. 
 
 In deciding if a teacher is a “minister,” we cannot have civil courts determining which 
faculty tasks are religiously important or meaningful and which are religiously unimportant or 
minor. That would violate the rule against deciding religious questions.205 In Our Lady, Justice 
Thomas filed a concurring opinion stating that the determination as to who is a minister ought 
to be unilaterally decided by the religious employer. That would avoid courts delving into 
prohibited religious questions.206 Justice Alito, for the Court, did not go that far. He noted the 
explicitly religious functions of the teachers here: teaching religion, as well as leading students 
in prayer and devotionals, attending mass with students. These tasks, of course, are explicitly 
religious for Christians. As to other religions, Justice Alito appealed to religious employers to 
make it clear which employees performed what the schools considered religious functions. “In 
a country with the religious diversity of the United States, judges cannot be expected to have a 
complete understanding and appreciation of the role played by every person who performs a 
particular role in every religious tradition. A religious institution’s explanation of the role of 
such employees in the life of the religion in question is important.”207 The Court’s approach 
was highly deferential to the two schools regarding their view that the teachers’ employment 
functions were religious. The Court held that the two elementary teachers were “ministers” for 
purposes of church autonomy.208 
 
Church autonomy involves freedom for religious organizations, but it is not a freedom 
from burdens on a religious belief or practice. Rather, it is a freedom of a religious organization 
to govern its internal affairs without interference by government. It is a defense that, when 
established, operates like a categorical immunity from being sued concerning the organization’s 
control over its doctrine, polity, and the selection and removal of the personnel that executes its 
desire to perpetuate the faith or exercises leadership to carry out its central mission. 
 
V.  THE DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING RELIGION 
 
The First Amendment’s use of the word “religion” necessarily makes the definition of 
religion a question of constitutional law. Although a definition is of great theoretical difficulty, 
in practice the issue rarely arises. Often the government stipulates to the nature of the claim 
“being religious,” but raises other defenses. To avoid omitting unfamiliar and emerging 
religions from constitutional protection, the Supreme Court has evaded defining the term.209 
Accordingly, the definition remains broad and indeterminate,210 as well as inclusive of 
 
 205 Id. at 2063 n.10. 
 206 Id. at 2069-71 (Thomas. J., concurring, joined by Justice Gorsuch). 
 207 Id. at 2066. 
 208 Id. at 2066-69. 
 209 The Court has addressed the definition of religion for the purpose of legislation and the military draft, but not 
for purposes of the First Amendment. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (plurality opinion); United 
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 210 A thoughtful discussion concerning the definition of religion appears in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 200 (3d 




naturalistic, nontheistic, and anthropocentric religions.211 However, if the definition is too 
broad the law becomes meaningless. Thus, for example, the definition excludes a purely 
personal or philosophical way of life.212 
 
Religious claimants under the First Amendment may disagree with members of their 
own denomination, be unsure or wavering,213 or be recent converts.214 A religious claimant 
need not be a member of an organized religious denomination, community, or sect.215 
However, a claimant must be sincere.216 Lastly, the Establishment Clause is not implicated 
when a law reflects a moral judgment about conduct that is harmful or beneficial to the 
common good, even if a religion shares that judgment.217 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The driving force behind the American disestablishment of state churches in the period 
1776 to 1833 was straightforward, if difficult to implement after centuries of Christendom.218 
The idea was that it is best for both church and government when “religious beliefs are a matter 
of voluntary choice by individuals and their [religious] associations, and that each sect is 
entitled to ‘flourish [or fail] according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its 
dogma.’”219 
 
With this principle in mind, the common thread that runs through most of the forgoing 
cases is the minimization of the government’s influence over the religious choices of 
individuals and organizations. In Espinoza, the rule of nondiscrimination in the funding of 
religious and nonreligious private schools in Montana was not an end in itself. Rather, equal 
treatment was a means to minimizing the government’s influence over the choices of parents 
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when enrolling their children in school, religious or otherwise. Similarly, when imposing 
general regulatory and tax burdens on society, the Court in Amos and Walz held that the 
government may exempt religious persons and organizations from those same burdens. This is 
government leaving religion alone, again minimizing its role so that private religious judgments 
can be freely made. 
 
 Critics compare funding cases like Espinoza and its rule of equal treatment with cases 
like Amos that have upheld religious exemptions, and they decry the apparent inconsistency. 
When equality helps religion, you are for equality, say the critics, but when being exceptional 
helps religion’s cause, you are for exemptions. Not so. The rule of equality and of exemptions 
are merely instrumental, tools in the service of minimizing government’s impact on private 
religious choice. The older term for this is religious voluntarism, the foregoing noted driving 
force behind the disestablishment of religion in America’s revolutionary states. 
 
Religious preferences are a different story, and so they are unconstitutional. These occur 
when government interjects itself into a private dispute and takes the side of religion over the 
interests of the other disputants. In Caldor, government unyieldingly sided with religious 
employees wanting their Sabbath off. In Larkin, government sided with churches wanting 
control over neighboring enterprises in busy downtowns. In both cases, the result was that some 
private actors were compelled by law to boost the religious observance of others. That does not 
minimize government’s influence over private religious choices, but increases it. 
 
 The same integrating principle of minimizing the government’s role over religious 
choices largely fits the Supreme Court’s cases involving government speech of religious 
content. Government should refrain from expressing itself in favor of (or against) an explicitly 
religious message or a particular religious observance. That part is easy. The difficulty comes 
in determining when the content of the government’s speech or observance is explicitly 
religious and when it is something else, such as honoring the sacrifices of the nation’s war 
dead, as with the WW I memorial cross in American Legion. That is not to say that the meaning 
of a Latin cross to Christians is anything less than the reason for Christ’s coming to this earth. 
It is just that the state of Maryland did not have in mind this explicitly Christian message when 
it took over the maintenance of the memorial to soldiers who died in the Great War. This is not 
a difficult concept: Government can have a secular message when sponsoring a memorial or 
other symbol, while at the same time there are those in the private sector that hear or see in that 
same symbol a profoundly religious message. The government is responsible only for its own 
messages and points of view. The Bill of Rights does not hold government to account for the 
multifarious interpretations of symbols by other viewers. The “not taking sides” principle 
enters into American Legion with the findings that Maryland neither intended to exclude non-
Christians nor sought to disparage the faiths of others.  
 
Town of Greece v. Galloway is admittedly a harder case, but the municipality’s 
reserving of time for local volunteers to render an opening prayer was understood as an attempt 
to solemnize the work of the council. Americans are still a religious people, and such a people 
instinctively seek to elevate the seriousness of an occasion, crisis, or civic danger with prayer. 




government prayer that intentionally marginalizes other religions or disparages those who 
practice them. 
 
 The rule against civil authorities taking up the validity, importance, or meaning of 
religious questions, and the larger command to completely shield from state oversight those 
discrete subjects entailing internal governance by churches, also work to minimize the 
government’s role in private religious choice. However, the church autonomy doctrine is about 
more than religious choices. The breathing space reserved by the doctrine is about sovereignty 
concerning the leaders and propagators of a religious organization and their role in a ministry’s 
operations, strategic planning, and vision for the future. There are a few things about religious 
institutions that have to remain in their complete control, being essential not just to their present 
wellbeing but also to their continued propagation, direction, and destiny. Over the centuries of 
Western legal tradition, the church and the state have worked out their respective spheres of 
authority. It is a laudable mark of governmental modesty when the modern regulatory state, 
with all its considerable power, can pause to acknowledge that the long arm of its writ is not 
without boundaries. 
